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Abstract 
 
The recent financial crisis has shown that the relatively new interconnectedness of different 
types of institutions leads to a transmission of risk between them, therefore increasing 
systemic risk. This study investigates whether and to what extent financial institutions in 
Germany and the United Kingdom are exposed to risk transmission. To achieve this, a state-
dependent sensitivity value at risk approach is chosen. The empirical estimates suggest that 
hedge funds are the predominant source of risk spillovers, both in Germany and the UK, 
while they themselves receive very little risk spillovers. For the United Kingdom, it is 
shown that the magnitude of risk transmission is similar to that observed for Germany. 
However, UK insurance firms are less prone to spillovers from the hedge fund industry, but 
more affected by risks transmitted from banks, indicating possible implications for policy 
making. Overall, the increase in risk spillovers in volatile times is striking and suggests 
adapting future regulation to account for this phenomenon. 
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1.  Introduction 
The financial system is exposed to a risk higher than the sum of the individual risk 
exposures of its institutions (Thiele, 2014). Past regulation of the financial sector has failed 
to adequately account for this, as the rapid spreading of the recent financial crisis has shown. 
Solely characterising institutions as ‘too big to fail’ has proven insufficient and considering 
that they may also be too interconnected to fail is vital (Chen et al., 2014), because 
relationships between different types of financial institutions leads to the risk that a shock 
affecting one type of institution will be transmitted to other types through this 
interconnectedness (Adams et al., 2014a), thus generating additional systemic risk.  
 
By recognizing the consequences of risk transmission between different institutions, a 
significant number of studies have been forthcoming in recent years, in particular, since the 
start of financial crisis. An example of the latter is when, Poirson and Schmittmann (2013) 
examined spillovers from the financial system of one country in the euro area to another, 
and Boyson et al. (2010) measured the dimension of spillover effects between different 
hedge funds styles. However, the interdependence between different types of institutions 
and thus the direction and the dimension of intra-country spillovers has historically been 
neglected (Gropp, 2014).  
 
Empirical findings on intra-German spillovers are limited to spillovers among specific 
banks and the research does not account for the direction of the risk transmission (Poirson 
and Schmittmann, 2013). Correspondingly, research on spillovers within the UK financial 
system is limited to spillover effects from specific institutions to the remaining banking 
system (Goldsmith-Pinkham and Yorulmazer, 2010) and neglects those spillovers between 
different types of financial institutions. Broadly speaking, the studies that empirically 
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investigated the linkage between different institutions focused only on the U.S. financial 
system (Billio et al., 2012; Adams et al., 2014a).  
 
Our study fills this gap and investigates whether and to what extent financial institutions in 
Germany and the United Kingdom, respectively, are exposed to risk transmission from 
other types of financial institutions affected by a shock, thus estimating the direction and 
the dimension of spillovers between banks, insurances and hedge funds. The choice of 
Germany and the UK as a case study is based on two reasons. First, this choice helps us in 
understanding the dynamics of risks and its connectivity among some important 
components of the financial system in two historically different financial structures (bank 
oriented in Germany and market-oriented in the UK). Second, since hedge funds were found 
to cause the strongest spillover effects to other institutions during times of financial distress 
(Adams et al., 2014a), the different regulatory approaches of Germany and the United 
Kingdom1 render the application of the statistical models used in previous studies to two of 
the important European financial markets interesting.  
 
In addition to above mentioned points, our study contributes to the existing empirical 
literature in many ways. First, the study provides a comparison between the two very large 
                                                        
1 Before the financial crisis, regulation of alternative investment funds was country-specific, but the European 
Union decided on minimum regulatory standards in 2010. Whereas the UK only implemented these standards 
to preserve locational advantages and variety of products, Germany passed stricter legal regulation and, for 
example, banned private investors from hedge funds investments (Schulz, 2013). Similarly, the approaches 
to insurance firms’ regulation differ between Germany and the UK. While they are both affected by capital-
based regulation on a European Union wide scale, the UK introduced little further restrictions, while Germany 
strictly limits insurers’ business (Kaiser, 2008). 
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and important countries by discussing in detail whether different regulatory approaches of 
these two countries further alter the interconnectedness. Second, our study in fact 
complements the study by Adams et al. (2014) who studied the direction and magnitude of 
risk from one institution to others for predominantly USA based financial institutions. Their 
coverage of the sectors was similar to ours and we believe that a European case study would 
help in either confirming or contrasting the earlier findings in a relatively different 
regulatory and economic environment settings as well as some differences in approaches to 
tackle financial crisis subsequently. In particular, the presence of larger universal banks in 
Germany further adds the value. Third, we discussed a number of policy options in 
understanding the interconnectivity. Our discussion of the limitations of our study and 
suggestions to improve the methodology further increase the utility of this study for future 
work in this area.      
 
The analysis of our empirical estimates suggests that hedge funds are the predominant 
source of risk spillovers, both in Germany and the UK, while they themselves receive very 
little risk. The findings for Germany suggested that spillovers between insurances and 
banks are almost non-existent during tranquil market times, but increase significantly in 
times of financial distress. It was shown that insurance firms suffered less from spillovers 
than banks, highlighting that the German approach to insurance regulation, based on 
limiting exposure to specific types of assets and institutions as well as prohibiting non-
insurance related businesses, might be a factor in curtailing their exposure.  For the United 
Kingdom, it could be shown that the magnitude of risk transmission is similar to that 
observed for Germany. It was however striking that an increase in risk in the insurances 
sector has an overall stabilising effect on the banking sector even if the respective bank is 
distressed. Compared to Germany, insurance firms were less prone to spillovers from the 
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hedge fund industry, but more affected by risks transmitted from banks. Overall, the 
increase in risk spillovers in volatile times was significant and suggests adapting future 
regulation to account for this. 
 
In comparison to earlier studies and in particular Adams et al. (2014a), our findings are 
different at least on two fronts. First, broadly speaking, our estimates although confirms 
Adams findings, especially concerning hedge funds as the most important factor in 
transmitting risk to the rest of the financial sector but clearly, the extent is not as extreme 
as their results suggested and this highlight the fact that the European approach to stricter 
hedge fund regulation might be a factor in preventing the spread of risks between different 
sectors during times of financial distress. Second, our estimates show that the spillovers 
from hedge funds to the German insurance sector are significantly lower during times of 
financial distress indicating that they are less interconnected with the rest of the financial 
sector. This is largely due to the differences in the regulatory approaches concerning 
insurances in Germany. Insurances in Germany are regulated relating to their 
interconnectedness through upper limits with regards to specific asset groups and 
investments with one specific provider which helped in preventing an increase in systemic 
risk. 
 
The remainder of the study is structured as follows: To contextualise the research question, 
the relevant literature is reviewed in the following section. After a definition of systemic 
risk, spillover effects and contagion, previous empirical approaches in the literature 
analysing the transmission of risk through spillovers is critically evaluated. The 
methodology employed to measure relevant risk spillovers is outlined in section 3 and the 
data of UK and German financial institutions that the study is based on is presented in 
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section 4. Section 5 contains the detailed analysis of the data with regard to risk 
transmission, as well as the results and section 6 concludes.  
 
2.  Review of Literature 
There are two distinct, yet interrelated dimensions to financial risk: first, a financial shock 
that simultaneously affects several institutions and prevents them from functioning properly 
and second, the possibility of difficulties of one financial institution being transmitted to 
originally largely unaffected institutions (Furfine, 2003). The detection of spillover effects 
is concerned with eliminating the influence of the former to measure the effects of the latter. 
 
Contagion, defined as “significant increase in cross-market linkages after a shock to an 
individual country” (Dornbusch et al., 2000), and spillover effects have been used 
interchangeably (Cathcart et al., 2013). The literature, however, makes two differentiations. 
One strand considers the mere increase in co-movement in crises a spillover effect, which 
in return leads to contagion in severe cases (Alter and Beyer, 2013). While this definition 
explains the spreading of a shock between geographic regions (Dornbusch et al., 2000; 
Alter and Beyer, 2013, 2014), it fails to account for intra-country dependencies between 
different financial institutions. Other researchers defined contagion as “the portion of 
interdependence which is not accounted for by the spillover effect” (Cathcart et al., 2013). 
For the purpose of this study, spillover effects, defined as negative externalities in the form 
of a transmission of a shock from one institution to another beyond their exposure to 
common factors (De Bruyckere et al., 2013), are analysed. In the following, we provide 
summary and discuss some recent studies on this issue. A further detail in this regard is 
provided in Appendix A.   
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Billio et al. (2012) investigated to what extent the U.S. financial sector is interrelated and 
found increased asymmetric connectedness, leading banks and insurance companies to 
more likely transmit shocks due to their asset illiquidity and the fact that, unlike hedge 
funds, they are not designed to withstand large losses (Billio et al., 2012). 
  
Spillover effects and contagion in hedge fund returns have been investigated by Boyson et 
al. (2010) who argue that adverse shocks to speculators’ funding liquidity lead to a 
reduction of leverage and thus of asset and funding liquidity. This creates a “self-reinforcing 
liquidity spiral” (Boyson et al., 2010) and hedge fund contagion. Their analysis provides 
evidence of a relation between liquidity shocks and hedge fund contagion, confirmed by 
Dudley and Nimalendran (2011) and expanded by Bussière et al. (2015). However, it has 
been shown that the interconnectedness of different financial institutions increased during 
the new millennium (Billio et al., 2012), indicating that transmission of risks might not be 
limited within one type (Bussière et al., 2015). This has historically been neglected (Bernal 
et al., 2014). When investigating the common exposure of hedge funds, Bussière et al. 
(2015) found that lately “commonality on hedge fund returns increased […] and that hedge 
funds exposed to the common actor suffered from worse performance” mostly caused by 
an increased exposure to emerging market equities. However, while they stress that this 
may affect the financial stability and call for careful monitoring (Bussière et al., 2015), they 
do not investigate adverse implications of a spreading of risk from hedge funds to other 
institutions. 
 
In terms of methodological developments, recently, a number of measures to capture 
interconnectedness have been developed, including the conditional value-at-risk (Adrian 
and Brunnermeier, 2008). Bernal et al. (2014) expand the Δ𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅 methodology to analyse 
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the contributions of the banking, insurance and other financial services sectors to systemic 
risk. They showed that the insurance sector was the largest contributor in the United States, 
whereas the Eurozone sector of other financial services was systemically the riskiest 
(Bernal et al., 2014). Their U.S. results were partially supported by Cummins and Weiss 
(2014) who found that non-core insurance activities contribute to systemic risk, whereas 
core functions do not as these are not sufficiently interconnected. This is supported by Allen 
and Gale (2007) who found that insurances and banks increasingly interact through credit 
risk transfer. However, the study measured the effects of adverse shocks to the financial 
sector on the real economy.  
 
Contrary to that, other studies quantify the systemic risk within the financial industries 
themselves. Bierth et al. (2015) analyse the exposure and contribution of insurers. They 
contradict the results of Bernal et al. (2014) and found that, while low during tranquil times, 
the contribution to systemic risk of insurers worldwide peaked during the recent financial 
crisis due to their extreme leverage and that their interconnectedness exposed themselves 
to systemic risk (Bierth et al., 2015). To account for interconnectedness, spillover effects 
that they argue are not captured in the monthly data employed by Billio et al. (2012) and 
the simultaneity of risk transmission,  
 
Adams et al. (2014a) measure the magnitude and direction of shocks from one institution 
to another for U.S. insurance companies, hedge funds, investment and commercial banks. 
Employing a state-dependent sensitivity value-at-risk model, they find that spillover effects 
are higher during volatile times. Their results further show that hedge funds are the main 
transmission channel for systemic risk. However, this analysis was based on U.S. data and 
may not be representative for the financial system of European countries. 
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3.  Methodology 
The aim of this study is to explore spillover effects between different types of financial 
institutions, namely banks, insurances and hedge funds. To this end, we compiled and 
constructed a representative data, including return indices of banks and insurances, based 
in Germany and the UK respectively. Because of the fact that the German banking system 
is characterised by universal banks, retail and investment banks are not considered 
separately in this study. This decision is supported by the fact that “little evidence for risk 
spillovers between these two groups” was found (Adams et al., 2014b). As direct 
information on hedge funds and their risk exposure is limited (Bussière et al., 2015), a pre-
calculated composite index will be employed. The HFRX Global Hedge Fund Index covers 
the complete range of hedge fund styles. The index weights are constructed using principal 
component (PC) analysis. The advantage of PC weights is that this linear combination 
preserves “the maximum possible proportion of the total variation in the original data set” 
(OECD, 2008) and the weights are derived from the correlation rather than the covariance 
matrix to not overweight institutions whose return series are characterised by a higher 
variance (Adams et al., 2014b). 
 
Daily values-at-risk are calculated for the different indices individually.  
 
(1)   𝑉𝑎?̂?𝑚 = ?̂?𝑚 + 𝑧?̂?𝑚,𝑡, 
 
where ?̂?𝑚  is the constant mean return of the institution. The 𝑉𝑎𝑅 calculated employing 
unconditional rolling standard deviation and deduction of the relevant value for 𝑧  to 
represent the 5%-quantile of the return distribution insufficiently captures the exposure. It 
decreases too late and fails to capture “the time-varying volatility of returns” (Adams et al., 
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2014a). Therefore, the time-varying conditional standard deviation is employed, estimated 
using a model of the GARCH family, as this could best account for volatility clustering in 
return series. One of the advantage of the EGARCH model is that it estimates the 
logarithmic conditional variance, which is thus not dependent on non-negative regression 
coefficients (Brooks, 2014). Further, they are asymmetric and capture whether negative or 
positive shocks are more persistent to volatility. For equity returns it is argued that negative 
shocks lead to a higher volatility rise than positive shocks of comparable magnitudes 
(Brooks, 2014), which are economically explained as a leverage effect (Bollerslev et al., 
1992). The captured asymmetry leads the 𝑉𝑎𝑅 series to closely follow the lower boundaries 
of the respective return series and therefore improves its sensitivity (Adams et al., 2014a).  
 
Contrary to Adrian and Brunnermeier (2008), Adams et al. (2014a) propose a two-stage 
estimation of the spillover coefficient to test whether it depends on the state of the economy. 
While the 5%-quantile of the return distribution represents the value-at-risk, low quantiles 
of said 𝑉𝑎𝑅 distribution represent financial distress and higher quantiles represent tranquil 
times. Therefore, the institutions’ individual fitted values-at-risk, 𝑉𝑎?̂?𝑚 , are regressed 
against their own lags, the fitted values-at-risk of the other institutions and a set of control 
variables to account for common risk factors rooted in the macroeconomic development of 
a country to not mistakenly interpret co-movement of returns as spillover effects. The 
system of regression equations is estimated employing a two-stage quantile regression. 
During the first stage, instrumental variables for the exogenous variables are found using 
ordinary least square (OLS) estimation. This ensures that potentially endogenous regressors 
are replaced by instruments to eliminate simultaneous causality bias. It is expected that the 
lag of the value-at-risk of one institution is significant in predicting the level of the value-
at-risk of that respective institution and can therefore serve as instruments. Comparable to 
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two-stage least squares estimation, the right-hand side variables that are endogenous are 
regressed against their instrumental variable. Subsequently, the fitted values are employed 
in the quantile regression.  
 
(2)          𝑉𝑎?̂?𝑖,𝑡,𝜃 = 𝛼1,𝜃 + 𝛽1,𝜃𝑉𝑎?̂?𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽2,𝜃𝑉𝑎?̂?𝑘,𝑡 + 𝛽3,𝜃𝑉𝑎?̂?𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾1,𝜃𝑉𝑎?̂?𝑐,𝑡 +
                            𝛾2,𝜃𝑉𝑎?̂?𝑟,𝑡 + 𝛾3,𝜃𝑉𝑎?̂?𝑛,𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 
 
(3) 𝑉𝑎?̂?𝑗,𝑡,𝜃 = 𝛼2,𝜃 + 𝛽4,𝜃𝑉𝑎?̂?𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5,𝜃𝑉𝑎?̂?𝑘,𝑡 + 𝛽6,𝜃𝑉𝑎?̂?𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛾4,𝜃𝑉𝑎?̂?𝑐,𝑡 +
                            𝛾5,𝜃𝑉𝑎?̂?𝑟,𝑡 + 𝛾6,𝜃𝑉𝑎?̂?𝑛,𝑡 + 𝑢𝑗,𝑡 
 
(4)            𝑉𝑎?̂?𝑘,𝑡,𝜃 = 𝛼3,𝜃 + 𝛽7,𝜃𝑉𝑎?̂?𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8,𝜃𝑉𝑎?̂?𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽9,𝜃𝑉𝑎?̂?𝑘,𝑡−1 + 𝛾7,𝜃𝑉𝑎?̂?𝑐,𝑡 +
                            𝛾8,𝜃𝑉𝑎?̂?𝑟,𝑡 + 𝛾8,𝜃𝑉𝑎?̂?𝑛,𝑡 + 𝑢𝑘,𝑡 
 
(5)           𝑉𝑎?̂?𝑐,𝑡,𝜃 = 𝛼4,𝜃 + 𝜕1,𝜃𝑉𝑎?̂?𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜕2,𝜃𝑉𝑎?̂?𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜕3,𝜃𝑉𝑎?̂?𝑘,𝑡 + 𝜕4,𝜃𝑉𝑎?̂?𝑐,𝑡−1 +
                            𝜕5,𝜃𝑉𝑎?̂?𝑟,𝑡 + 𝜕6,𝜃𝑉𝑎?̂?𝑛,𝑡 + 𝑢𝑐,𝑡 
 
(6)            𝑉𝑎?̂?𝑟,𝑡,𝜃 = 𝛼5,𝜃 + 𝜕7,𝜃𝑉𝑎?̂?𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜕8,𝜃𝑉𝑎?̂?𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜕9,𝜃𝑉𝑎?̂?𝑘,𝑡 + 𝜕10,𝜃𝑉𝑎?̂?𝑟,𝑡−1 +
                            𝜕11,𝜃𝑉𝑎?̂?𝑐,𝑡 + 𝜕12,𝜃𝑉𝑎?̂?𝑛,𝑡 + 𝑢𝑟,𝑡 
 
 
(7)           𝑉𝑎?̂?𝑛,𝑡,𝜃 = 𝛼6,𝜃 + 𝜕13,𝜃𝑉𝑎?̂?𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜕14,𝜃𝑉𝑎?̂?𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜕15,𝜃𝑉𝑎?̂?𝑘,𝑡 + 𝜕16,𝜃𝑉𝑎?̂?𝑛,𝑡−1 
                       + 𝜕17,𝜃𝑉𝑎?̂?𝑐,𝑡 + 𝜕18,𝜃𝑉𝑎?̂?𝑟,𝑡 + 𝑢𝑛,𝑡 
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𝑉𝑎?̂?𝑖, 𝑉𝑎?̂?𝑗 and 𝑉𝑎?̂?𝑘 are the fitted values-at-risk of the individual institutional indices for 
banks, insurances and hedge funds, respectively. 𝑉𝑎?̂?𝑐 , 𝑉𝑎?̂?𝑟   and 𝑉𝑎?̂?𝑛  are the fitted 
VaRs of the respective control variables. Although the 𝜕-coefficient vector is not of interest, 
the equations are included to allow for “feedback effects with [the] financial institutions” 
(Adams et al., 2014a). 
 
The 𝜃-quantile describes the financial state of the receiving institution as the effect of a 
shock should be stronger if the institution is weakened (Adams et al., 2014a). At the 75%-
quantile, the market is assumed to be tranquil, while it is volatile at the 12.5%-quantile. 
Normal markets conditions are represented by the 50%-quantile. While this specification 
introduces some arbitrariness to the model, it has very little effect on the results. Because it 
is expected that the spillovers are most striking for distressed market conditions, 10%- and 
15%-quantiles will also be employed as a robustness check. The spillover coefficient 
vectors are obtained from the individual 𝛽-coefficients.  
 
(8)   𝐵𝑖,𝜃 = (?̂?1,𝜃, ?̂?2,𝜃) 
 
(9)   𝐵𝑗,𝜃 = (?̂?4,𝜃, ?̂?5,𝜃) 
 
(10)   𝐵𝑘,𝜃 = (?̂?7,𝜃, ?̂?8,𝜃) 
 
These spillover coefficient vectors determine the risk transmission from one type of 
institution to another. The fitted 𝑆𝐷𝑆𝑉𝑎𝑅 is then obtained through the following equation. 
 
(11)  𝑆𝐷𝑆𝑉𝑎𝑅̂ {𝑖|𝑗,𝑘},𝑡,𝜃 = 𝛼𝜃 + 𝛽1,𝜃𝑉𝑎?̂?𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽2,𝜃𝑉𝑎?̂?𝑘,𝑡 + 𝛽3,𝜃𝑉𝑎?̂?𝑖,𝑡−1 
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From these coefficients, it is possible to interpret the magnitude and the direction of 
spillovers depending on the state of the financial market.  
 
4.  Data Sources 
The equity price series of German and UK banks and insurances were acquired from 
Thomson Reuters Datastream. For the analysis, returns were calculated from the stock price 
series and indices were determined employing principal component weightings. 
 
The German insurance index contains data from six insurance firms that are publicly listed 
in Germany (Allianz, Münchener Rück, Hannover Rück, Talanx, Axa and Generali). For 
the UK, the insurance index consists of eight insurance firms, namely Amlin, Aviva, 
Chesnara, the Direct Line Insurance Group, the Esure Group, Helios Underwriting, Legal 
and General and the Novae Group.  
 
The banking sector index for Germany consists of the data from nine banks including 
Deutsche Bank, Deutsche Postbank, Commerzbank, Wüstenrot and Württembergische, 
Aareal Bank, DVB Bank, IKB, Comdirect, Oldenburgische LB and DAB Bank. These 
banking firms experienced different levels of distress during the crisis, which 
geographically originated in the United States. Whereas the IKB was the first German bank 
to experience large difficulties in the course of the financial crisis and had to be rescued by 
the state and a consortium of banks (Hader et al., 2009), Talanx was only moderately 
affected by the crisis and constantly increased their annual profits (Schmitt, 2011). The UK 
banking index constitute seven banks including Aldermore Group, Barclays, the European 
  
15 
 
Islamic Investment Bank, HSBC, Lloyds, the Royal Bank of Scotland, the Secure Trust 
Bank and Standard Chartered, which are all listed in the UK. 
 
For hedge funds, the HFRX Global index provided by Hedge Fund Research and accessed 
through the Bloomberg database is employed. Whereas Adams et al. (2014b) argue that the 
HFRX indices generally are “not fully representative of the entire hedge fund universe”, 
the HFRX Global Index aims at representing the composition of the hedge fund universe 
(UBS, 2012) and is therefore employed as a proxy. Because return data is not self-reported, 
the index does not suffer from self-selection bias (Adams et al., 2014a). While Adams et 
al. (2014a) employ the HFRX Equally Weighted Index, they indicate that results are 
unaffected if the Global Hedge Fund Index is employed instead. With a total of 45 
constituents, all eligible hedge fund strategies are represented in the index. Due to the fact 
that it is only available from March 31st, 2003, it is the limiting factor of the time horizon 
of this study, which covers the period from March 31st, 2003 to July 27, 2015. 
 
The control variables were obtained from two different data sources, namely Bloomberg 
and Börse Frankfurt. They are included in the regression to control for the macroeconomic 
development that is not intended to influence the regression results in that it could 
mistakenly be attributed to the influence of other institutions. For Germany and the UK, the 
SandP GSCI spot market commodity index is included as a “measure of general price 
movements and inflation in the world economy” (“Commodities performance overview”, 
2015). It is a composite index of the most liquid commodity futures that are included with 
weights according to “their respective world production quantities” (Goldman Sachs, 
2015). Additionally, the DAX ex Financials 30 TR Index is included to cover the overall 
economic development of publicly listed companies that are not from the insurance, 
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financial services or banking sector. The index covers “the largest and best-performing 
companies from the DAX index” (Deutsche Börse, 2015), which are not part of the 
respective industries. The last included control variable for Germany is the RX REIT index, 
an index that tracks the development of the three active German real estate investment trusts 
(G-REITs) (Börse Frankfurt, 2015). The act on the introduction of German Real Estate 
Stock Corporations with Listed Shares introduced German REITs in June 2007, but took 
retroactive effect as of January 2007 (Voss, 2008). For the UK, the FTSE non-Financial 
Index is included to cover non-financial firm performance and the FTSE EPRA/NAREIT 
Index controls for the performance of UK-listed real estate companies and REITs. All data 
sources are summarised and can be found in Table 1. 
 
[Insert table 1 about here] 
 
5.  Empirical Results  
The results of the econometric analysis are summarised in the following way: Firstly, the 
created index series are presented, followed by the calculated values-at-risk for the 
institutional indices. Subsequently, to answer the research questions whether there are risk 
spillovers between different types of institutions in Germany and the United Kingdom and 
if so what direction these spillovers take, the spillover coefficients are analysed. Finally, 
possible applications of the spillover coefficient are illustrated by presenting the state-
dependent sensitivity value-at-risk. 
 
5.1 Index series 
Firstly, the equity price series of UK and German banks and insurances were transformed 
logarithmically and the first difference was taken to create a return series. Using principal 
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component weights, indices were created from these return series2. Principal component 
analysis, rather than equal weights, was chosen to determine the weights of the individual 
institutions that the index is composed of. Even though Adams et al. (2014a) indicated that 
it does not qualitatively change their outcome, the data sample underlying this analysis 
suggests otherwise. As equal weights tend to assign higher weights to those series with high 
volatility (Adams et al., 2014b) and because, in this sample, those individual series with 
higher returns on average are more volatile, PC weights hence better represent the 
subsamples.  
 
5.2 Individual values-at-risk 
Following the index creation, individual values-at-risk were calculated according to 
formula (1). The standard deviation was determined using an EGARCH (1,1) because it has 
been suggested that this dimension sufficiently captures volatility in the variance (Brooks, 
2014). For the model estimation, normally distributed errors were assumed.3 Because daily 
data on hedge fund returns is only available from April 2003 onward, the sample period 
covers 5,217 observations of each series from April 2, 2003 to July 27, 20154. 
 
5.3 Estimation of the spillover coefficient vector 
The regression system (2-7) was estimated twice, once excluding the REIT indices as these 
are only available from 2007 onwards due to changes in the legislation on real estate 
                                                        
2 The indices created in this way, as well as the corresponding weights, are available upon request. 
3 However, results are not altered by the assumption of the error distribution or the dimension of the model, 
even a symmetric GARCH model leaves the results qualitatively unaltered (Adams et al., 2014a). 
4 The individual index return series and the corresponding values-at-risk are available upon request. 
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investment trusts (Voss, 2008) and once including the REIT indices as control variables, 
but reducing the sample period to the years 2007 to mid-2015.  
 
Before analysing the spillover coefficients, it is important to highlight the improved 
information content of the spillover coefficients compared to solely expressing co-
movement through correlation coefficients. To do so, the correlation coefficients are 
presented in Table 2 for Germany and the UK, respectively. The observation period is 
subdivided into three subsamples. The first one covers the pre-crisis period from April 1, 
2003 to August 8, 2007. The crisis period begins on August 9, 2007 when the credit crunch 
was pinpointed in Europe and ends after the second quarter of 2009. The third period is a 
post financial crisis period in which, however, the macroeconomic situation in Europe is 
still characterised by the euro area sovereign debt crisis, which continued to influence the 
behaviour of financial institutions in Germany and the United Kingdom (Popov and Van 
Horen, 2014).  
[Insert table 2 about here] 
 
For both countries, the co-movement between the returns of banks and insurances is 
stronger than the co-movement of these institutions with hedge funds. It is striking that, 
while the correlation coefficients generally increase from the pre-crisis to the crisis period 
in Germany, this is not the case for the United Kingdom, where they all decrease. Whereas 
the development after the financial crisis is ambiguous, the coefficients augment for all 
institutions in the UK. However, the strict definition of time periods introduces arbitrariness 
into the model and correlations are symmetric, the correlation coefficient do not allow for 
statistical inferences. Hence, spillover coefficients were estimated. 
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It was first tested whether the first lags of the respective value-at-risk are valid instruments 
by regressing the 𝑉𝑎𝑅 levels against their lag and a constant. It can be seen from Table 3 
that the lags of the values-at-risk are highly significant at one per cent level of significance 
in predicting the 𝑉𝑎𝑅 of every institution. They therefore constitute valid instruments for 
the second step, in which the spillover coefficients were estimated employing quantile 
regression. 
 
[Insert table 3 about here] 
 
Table 4 and Table 5 present the estimated results for the 𝛽 -spillover coefficients of 
equations (2) through (7), excluding REIT indices as control variables and for the different 
states of the financial market as defined by the respective quantile 𝜃. The corresponding 
results for the shorter observation period, but including the respective REIT index, are not 
qualitatively altered and can be found in appendices (Appendix B.1 and Appendix B.2). 
Comparably, it also became evident that the specification of the particular quantiles does 
not negatively affect the outcome, as the results are robust even for 10%- and 15%-quantiles 
representing economic distress of an institution. 
 
Table 4 presents the regression coefficients for Germany. The estimates show that the 
interconnectedness in tranquil times is almost non-existent (below one hundredth of a per 
cent or even a slightly inverted relationship between banks and insurances and vice versa); 
only hedge funds display significant spillovers to the rest of the financial sector, mainly to 
insurances and to a lesser extent to banks in volatile market conditions. Every single 
spillover factor increases from a tranquil to a normal state of the market and this, overall, 
applies as well to the transition from normal to volatile market states, thus verifying the 
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hypothesis of increased risk exposure in crisis times. Depending on the definition of the 
quantile for a volatile state of the market, the spillover effects from the hedge fund industry 
to the German insurance sector increase from 0.04% (75%-quantile) to 0.3% (10%-
quantile).  The results are similar for spillovers from hedge funds to banks (albeit not 
significant), making hedge funds the most important source of risk spillovers within the 
German financial sector.  
 
[Insert table 4 about here] 
 
Another important observation is that risk spillovers to the German insurance sector are 
comparable to those of the banking sector in tranquil and normal times. The spillovers are, 
however, strikingly lower than those to the banking sector during times of financial distress. 
This result is different from that found by Adams et al. (2014a). It can be asserted that, 
while the U.S. insurance sector was badly affected by depreciations on credit derivatives as 
seen for the most prominent example of American International Group (AIG), the German 
insurance sector was largely untroubled by the financial crisis (Deutsche Bundesbank, 
2009). Taking the results concerning their exposure to spillover effects into consideration, 
it becomes obvious that they are less interconnected with the rest of the financial sector. 
This is largely due to the differences in the regulatory approaches concerning banks and 
insurances in Germany. Insurances are regulated less with regard to capital requirements, 
but rather relating to their interconnectedness through upper limits with regards to, on the 
one hand, specific asset groups and investments with one specific provider on the other 
(Kaiser, 2008). Furthermore, through prohibiting business that is unrelated to the core 
function of insuring, German regulation, in contrast to U.S. regulation, prevents an increase 
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in systemic risk as found by Cummins and Weiss (2014). It seems that this approach has 
proven successful during financial distress of insurances. 
 
Compared to the correlation coefficients, it can be asserted that the increase in the influence 
of the value-at-risk of different institutions from tranquil to volatile times is much higher 
than that realised according to the correlation coefficients. It also becomes clear that it is 
important to account for the direction of the risk transmission: While the correlation 
between banks and hedge funds and insurances and hedge funds, respectively, is weaker 
than the link between the returns of banks and insurances, the results from the spillover 
estimation are twofold: Whereas the spillover from the hedge fund industry to banks and 
insurances is significant, especially when the latter are experiencing distress, the hedge fund 
industry barely experiences any change in its value-at-risk triggered by German banks and 
insurances. This is plausible because the hedge fund index is itself composed of 
international hedge funds and thus only limitedly affected by the risks of the German 
financial sector. It is shown that the restricting approach to regulation of hedge funds has 
not prevented immense spillovers to the German financial system. 
 
Overall, spillovers are negligible when the market is tranquil, but are slightly higher during 
times when the market is in a normal state and increase significantly when the market 
becomes distressed. While hedge funds are least affected by spillovers, insurances are still 
less impacted than banks. It could be stated that measuring the direction of influence is of 
importance, which was most prominently shown for hedge funds. It again becomes evident 
for UK data that, while correlation coefficients are symmetric, the spillover coefficients 
indicate the direction from an originating institution to the receiving one.  While the co-
movement, expressed as correlation, increases during crises times, this increase is more 
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distinct when measured through risk spillovers comparing tranquil and volatile periods: 
Whereas an increase in the 𝑉𝑎𝑅 of banks only increases the 𝑉𝑎𝑅 of insurances by 0.01%, 
the same relationship is magnified to around 0.04% during crisis times. 
 
It becomes obvious that spillovers have about the same magnitude as in Germany. The 
relationship from the insurance to the banking sector, however, is an inverse one: If the 
value-at-risk of insurances increases, then that of banks decreases. Once again, hedge funds 
are the most important originator of 𝑉𝑎𝑅 spillovers and their influence increases drastically 
from tranquil to volatile states, but they experience very little risk spillovers from the UK 
insurances and banks. Compared to Germany, UK insurances suffered more significant 
spillovers from the banking sector, but less spillover from the hedge fund industry. The UK 
insurance sector itself is the only one of the five sectors analysed that does not show extreme 
persistence of shocks in volatile times. The remaining industries in Germany and the United 
Kingdom exhibit regression coefficients exceeding the value of one during volatile (and 
solely during volatile) times. This shows that, during financial distress, shocks to the 𝑉𝑎𝑅 
of the institutions propagate during the following days instead of dying away, increasing 
the systemic risk. 
[Insert table 5 about here] 
 
In an effort to perform some sensitivity analysis of our estimates with respect to choice of 
estimation method and stability/statistical significance of spillovers coefficients, we 
experimented with three other alternative approaches including GARCH, AVGARCH and 
TGARCH5. Broadly speaking, the conclusions and implications discussed above remained 
                                                        
5 The results can be obtained from the authors upon further request. 
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qualitatively and quantitatively almost the same. All those coefficients which became 
significant with alternative estimation methods did not change the sign and significance 
level was around 10%. More specifically, in utilising GARCH, for Germany, changes only 
affect the coefficients originating from hedge funds to insurances and banks for quantile θ 
= 0.75 and quantile θ = 0.5. For the UK, newly significant variables were solely hedge fund 
originating spillovers to insurances and banks for θ = 0.75 and θ = 0.5. Other than that, 
there are merely some changes in the levels of significance in both directions. 
 
In the case of using AVGARCH, for Germany, the spillover coefficient from hedge funds 
to insurances in normal times (θ = 0.5) went from 10% significance level to insignificant. 
The spillover coefficient from insurances to bank became insignificant for one parameter 
of volatile times (θ = 0.125), while becoming significant for another (θ = 0.1). For the UK, 
only the spillover coefficient from hedge funds to banks in volatile times (θ = 0.1) went 
from insignificant to significant at the 10% level, reinforcing the hypothesis of hedge funds 
as a main source of risk spillovers. Similarly, for TGARCH specification, two coefficients 
became insignificant (hedge funds and insurances) for θ = 0.5 and θ = 0.125 for Germany. 
For the UK, only change was hedge funds to banks for θ = 0.1. 
 
To exemplify the interconnectedness and using our main method (EGARCH), two spillover 
coefficients are analysed in more detail in Figure 1 and Figure 2: the spillover coefficient 
from German banks to German insurances, has shown a comparatively modest increase for 
volatile times and the spillover coefficient from hedge funds to the UK banking industry, 
has shown a more extreme increase. They present the estimated spillover coefficient and 
the corresponding 95% confidence interval, as well as the coefficient and confidence 
interval that would have been estimated if OLS estimation had been employed instead of a 
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quantile regression. It can be seen for both figures that this coefficient overestimates 
spillovers during tranquil times, while underestimating them during times of distress. This 
would lead to an inefficient allocation of capital during tranquil and normal times and an 
underestimation of risk during volatile times, increasing the risk of bankruptcy. Thus, the 
informational value gained through the state dependent sensitivity value-at-risk improves 
the risk analysis. 
 
Excluding marginal values, Figure 1 shows that spillovers from German banks to 
insurances are of very little importance for medium to high quantiles of the distribution 
(tranquil and normal times), but increase to above 0.03% for lower, and especially very 
low, quantiles, for which insurers are regarded as being in distress. However, the coefficient 
remains comparatively low. This is very different for the spillover coefficient from hedge 
funds to the UK banking sector: While it fluctuates around zero for normal to tranquil times, 
it increases to above 0.6% during times, in which UK banks experience financial distress 
(Figure 2). It is visualised that the hedge fund industry supports liquidity when access to 
credit markets is easy, but amplifies crises when liquidity dries up and other institutions are 
in distress (Brunnermeier and Pederson, 2009). 
 
Overall, the findings by Adams et al. (2014a) could be confirmed by European case study, 
especially concerning hedge funds as the most important factor in transmitting risk to the 
rest of the financial sector. However, the extent is not as extreme as their results suggested: 
The highest found spillover effect that originated from hedge funds was equal to 0.42% for 
UK banks during volatile times. Contrary to that, Adams et al. found spillovers with a 
magnitude of 0.71% to investment banks (2014a). It can thus be asserted that the European 
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approach to stricter hedge fund regulation might be a factor in preventing the spread of risks 
between different sectors during times of financial distress.  
 
5.4 Application of the spillover coefficients 
The estimated spillover coefficients can be employed to estimate the state-dependent 
sensitivity value-at-risk (𝑆𝐷𝑆𝑉𝑎𝑅) for any institution depending on the state of the financial 
markets (tranquil, normal, volatile) and the value-at-risk of the other institutions. To do so, 
it must first be decided on the state of the institution at time 𝑡, depending on which, the 
quantile 𝜃 is set to a low value (distress) or higher value (prosperity). The value-at-risk can 
then be forecasted employing the coefficients as estimated in Table 4 &5 above employing 
formula (11) repeated below again: 
 
(12)      𝑆𝐷𝑆𝑉𝑎𝑅̂ {𝑖|𝑗,𝑘},𝑡,𝜃 = 𝛼𝜃 + 𝛽1,𝜃𝑉𝑎?̂?𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽2,𝜃𝑉𝑎?̂?𝑘,𝑡 + 𝛽3,𝜃𝑉𝑎?̂?𝑖,𝑡−1 
 
To estimate the 𝑆𝐷𝑆𝑉𝑎𝑅 as an example for German insurances during normal and volatile 
times, this equation would become: 
 
(13)  𝑆𝐷𝑆𝑉𝑎𝑅̂ {{𝑗|𝑖,𝑘}},𝑡,0.5 = −0.0002 + 0.0079 ∗ 𝑉𝑎?̂?𝑖,𝑡 + 0.0682 ∗ 𝑉𝑎?̂?𝑘,𝑡 
      +0.9445 ∗ 𝑉𝑎?̂?𝑗,𝑡−1 
 
(14)   𝑆𝐷𝑆𝑉𝑎𝑅̂ {𝑗|𝑖,𝑘},𝑡,0.125 = 0.0003 + 0.0149 ∗ 𝑉𝑎?̂?𝑖,𝑡 + 0.2995 ∗ 𝑉𝑎?̂?𝑘,𝑡 
      +1.0312 ∗ 𝑉𝑎?̂?𝑗,𝑡−1 
 
Unlike normal 𝑉𝑎𝑅 estimation, this accounts for both, the state of the institution in question 
and the spillover effects, through which the rest of the financial system exerts influence on 
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the insurance sector, by including the relevant coefficients of other institutions for the 
respective quantile. As can be seen, the spillover coefficients are sufficiently small during 
normal times (𝜃=0.5) and increase significantly when insurances experience recessions 
(𝜃=0.1). This information can be crucial in predicting the transmission of a shock through 
the entire financial system of a country and thus is of prominent informational value for 
regulators. Furthermore, if the transmission channels through the financial system can be 
measured, the institutions themselves can react more adequately, anticipating the possible 
implications for them. The financial firms do not require explicit knowledge of their 
underlying ties with other institutions as these are represented by the spillover coefficients. 
Returning to the initial example of a hedge fund facing margin calls, this means that an 
insurer could estimate the impact on their risk, measured by the 𝑆𝐷𝑆𝑉𝑎𝑅 , in a timely 
manner without exactly being aware of the underlying interconnection.  
 
There are, however, some limitations to the above mentioned approach: Due to the fact that 
daily data was chosen to measure immediate responses from other institutions, spillover 
effects that only occur more than one day after the original shock cannot be detected. 
Additionally, the proposed methodology cannot explain the underlying economic reasons 
for the transmission of risk, as this would require more detailed data from the hedge fund 
industry. Furthermore, it must be noted that spillover effects can only be detected if there 
has been a shock to the value-at-risk of the originating institution. If, for instance, 
insurances were to refrain from insuring banks’ credit risk through credit derivatives, such 
as credit default swaps, the risk of banks would certainly be influenced (Allen and Gale, 
2007), but this risk transmission would remain undetected because the insurance firms were 
not subject to a 𝑉𝑎𝑅 shock themselves. However, even if the risk transmission could not be 
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depicted in its entirety, the remarkable magnitude of the measured spillovers and their 
important implications could be demonstrated in this study. 
 
6.  Conclusion  
The fast spreading of the recent crisis from the U.S. subprime housing market to the 
financial sector and within the financial sector has shown that regulation has to some extent 
failed to account for the diverse dimensions of systemic risk. While the concept of ‘too big 
to fail’ has become widely accepted, the awareness of institutions being ‘too interconnected 
to fail’ has only recently been raised. This interconnectedness of financial institutions, 
however, possibly has extreme implications for the transmission of risk.  
 
As previous findings suggested hedge funds to be the most relevant source of spillovers, it 
was expected that they will play a predominant role; however, more stringent regulation in 
Europe, and especially Germany, led to the expectation of a lower overall degree of risk 
transmission. Our estimates suggested that hedge funds are the predominant source of risk 
spillovers, both in Germany and the UK, while they receive very little risk spillovers 
themselves. This is in accordance with the large body of literature that identified hedge 
funds as a main driver in financial crises for other countries. Further findings for Germany 
suggested that spillovers between insurances and banks are almost non-existent during 
tranquil market times, but increase significantly in times of financial distress. It could be 
shown that insurances suffered less from spillovers than banks, highlighting that the 
German approach to insurance regulation might be a factor in curtailing their exposure to 
risk. For the UK, it could be shown that the magnitude of risk transmission is similar to that 
observed for Germany. It was, however, striking that an increase in risk in the insurances 
sector has an overall stabilising effect on the banking sector even if the respective bank is 
  
28 
 
distressed. Compared to Germany, insurances were less prone to spillovers from the hedge 
fund industry, but were more affected by risks transmitted from banks. Overall, the increase 
in risk spillovers in volatile times recommends taking the interconnectedness of financial 
institutions as a source of additional risk seriously. 
 
It is thus essential for regulation to allow for a systemic approach to the regulation of the 
financial sector. The extent of the spillovers calls for an adaptation of the measuring of risk 
within the institutions to more accurately depict the risk exposure. While first steps have 
been taken to account for the interconnectedness of institutions (see for example IAIS 
framework), showing that the concept of ‘too complex to fail’ is being integrated into 
insurance regulation, the current changes to regulation are heavily debatable. 
 
The shortcomings should be the connecting factor for future research. To even more 
accurately depict the transmission of risk, a methodology that can account for spillovers 
without an initial shock to the value-at-risk of an institution could be developed. 
Additionally, it is advisable to conduct similar research in further countries, including an 
analysis of their regulation, so as to establish a best practice framework with regard to the 
regulation of the intertwined sectors. Furthermore, it is advisable that hedge fund regulation 
requires more detailed disclosure, as this would enable future researchers to examine the 
economic reasons underlying the immense risk transmission stemming from the hedge fund 
industry.  
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Table 1: Data sources 
Series Description Source 
German bank index index of stock prices of banks listed in Germany (July 28, 1995 to July 27, 
2015); constituents: Deutsche Bank, Deutsche Postbank, Commerzbank, 
Wüstenrot and Württembergische, Aareal Bank, DVB Bank, IKB, Comdirect, 
Oldenburgische LB and DAB Bank 
Datastream 
German insurance index index of stock prices of insurances listed in Germany (July 28, 1995 to July 27, 
2015); constituents: Allianz, Münchener Rück, Hannover Rück, Talanx, Axa 
and Generali 
Datastream 
UK bank index index of stock prices of banks listed in the UK (July 28, 1995 to July 27, 2015); 
constituents: Aldermore Group, Barclays, the European Islamic Investment 
Bank, HSBC, Lloyds, the Royal Bank of Scotland, the Secure Trust Bank and 
Standard Chartered 
Datastream 
UK insurance index index of stock prices of insurances listed in the UK (July 28, 1995 to July 27, 
2015); constituents: Amlin, Aviva, Chesnara, the Direct Line Insurance Group, 
the Esure Group, Helios Underwriting, Legal and General and the Novae Group 
Datastream 
HFRX Global Hedge Fund 
Index 
hedge fund index comprising 45 active hedge funds that aims to represent the 
hedge fund universe by covering the different hedge fund styles (March 31st, 
2003 to July 27, 2015) 
Bloomberg 
SandP GSCI TR index including most liquid commodity futures, world-production weighted 
(January 3rd, 2000 to July 27, 2015), indicator for general price movements and 
inflation 
Bloomberg 
DAX ex Financials 30 TR return-based index comprising the 30 largest and best-performing companies 
excluding such from the financial services, banking and insurance sectors 
Bloomberg 
X REIT Index performance index comprised of the three currently existing German real estate 
investment trusts (November, 7th, 2007 to July 27, 2015) 
Börse Frankfurt, 
http://www.boerse-
frankfurt.de/en/equiti
es/indices 
/rx+reit+index+perfo
rmance+DE00 
0A0MEN66, 
accessed August, 27th 
2015 
FTSE Non-Financial Index FTSE all-share index excluding companies from financial services, banking and 
insurance sectors (January 4th, 2000 to July 27, 2015), 
Bloomberg 
FTSE EPRA/NAREIT Index tracks performance of 33 real estate companies and REITs listed on the London 
Stock Exchange (January 1st, 2007 to July 27, 2015) 
Bloomberg 
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Table 2: Correlation Coefficients 
  Banks Insurances Hedge funds 
Germany     
pre-crisis period Banks - 0.7249 0.5358 
Insurances 0.7249 - 0.4843 
Hedge funds 0.5358 0.4843 - 
crisis period Banks - 0.7904 0.5507 
Insurances 0.7904 - 0.4697 
Hedge funds 0.5507 0.4697 - 
post-crisis period Banks - 0.7989 0.4924 
Insurances 0.7989 - 0.5306 
Hedge funds 0.4924 0.5306 - 
United Kingdom     
pre-crisis period Banks - 0.6929 0.4775 
Insurances 0.6929 - 0.5011 
Hedge funds 0.4775 0.5011 - 
crisis period Banks - 0.6859 0.3513 
Insurances 0.6859 - 0.3512 
Hedge funds 0.3513 0.3512 - 
post-crisis period Banks - 0.7134 0.5041 
Insurances 0.7134 - 0.5220 
Hedge funds 0.5041 0.5220 - 
 
  
  
35 
 
Table 1: Instruments OLS Regression 
Institutions/parameters Estimates 
Germany 1882 d.o.f. 
Banks 𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡 -0.0002** (-2.51) 
𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 0.9912 ***(323.70) 
Insurances 𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑗,𝑡−1 
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡 -0.0002*** (-3.55) 
𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑗,𝑡−1 0.9852*** (251.56) 
Hedge funds 𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑘,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑘,𝑡−1 
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡 0.0001*** (-4.25) 
𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑘,𝑡−1 0.9776***(205.31) 
  
United Kingdom 1882 d.o.f. 
Banks 𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡 -0.0002** (-2.60) 
𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 0.9893 ***(292.87) 
Insurances 𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑗,𝑡−1 
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡 -0.0002** (-3.26) 
𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑗,𝑡−1 0.9853*** (251.14) 
Hedge funds 𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑘,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑘,𝑡−1 
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡 0.0001*** (-4.25) 
𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑘,𝑡−1 0.9776***(205.31) 
Notes: t-statistic in parentheses; ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 4: Spillover Coefficients for Germany 
 
Spillover-originating institution (spillover vector 
𝐵) 
Control variables 
Spillover-receiving 
institution 
Banks Insurances Hedge funds 
GSCI 
index 
 
Non-financial 
index 
Lagged 
𝑉𝑎𝑅 
Volatile 
𝜃 = 0.75 
Banks - -0.0020 0.0228 0.0060 -0.0082 0.9511*** 
Insurances 0.0056 - 0.0427* 0.0017 -0.0005 0.9245*** 
Hedge funds -0.0006 -0.0008 - 0.0007 0.0008 0.9035*** 
Normal 
 𝜃 = 0.5 
Banks - 0.0009 0.0801 0.0028 -0.0013 0.9697*** 
Insurances 0.0079 - 0.0682* 0.0052 -0.0004 0.9445*** 
Hedge funds -0.0004 0.0000 - 0.0005 -0.0004 0.9477*** 
Volatile 
 𝜃 = 0.15 
Banks - 0.0260 0.1596 0.0304** -0.0177 1.0131*** 
Insurances 0.0061 - 0.0805 0.0082 0.0107 1.0212*** 
Hedge funds 0.0011 0.0021 - 0.0024 -0.0094** 1.0761*** 
Volatile 
 𝜃 =
0.125 
Banks - 0.0547* 0.1431 0.0265** -0.0232 1.0109*** 
Insurances 0.0050 - 0.1399 0.0064 0.0071 1.0349*** 
Hedge funds 0.0015 0.0003 - 0.0034 -0.0090** 1.0763*** 
Volatile 
 𝜃 = 0.1 
Banks - 0.0538 0.3360** 0.0208 -0.0194 1.0393*** 
Insurances 0.0149 - 0.2995*** -0.0003 0.0070 1.0312*** 
Hedge funds 0.0006 -0.0004 - 0.0043* -0.0082* 1.1003*** 
Notes: ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 5: Spillover Coefficients for the United Kingdom 
 
Spillover-originating institution (spillover 
vector 𝐵) 
Control variables 
Spillover-receiving institution Banks Insurances Hedge funds 
GSCI 
index 
 
Non-financial 
index 
Lagged 
𝑉𝑎𝑅 
Tranquil 𝜃 =
0.75 
Banks - -0.0020 0.0444 0.0001 0.0155 0.9334*** 
Insurances 0.0115** - 0.0387 -0.0067 0.0064 0.9078*** 
Hedge 
funds 
0.0000 -0.0006 - 0.0006 0.0005 0.9009*** 
Normal 𝜃 =
0.5 
Banks - -0.0028 0.0551 0.0112 0.0083 0.9645*** 
Insurances 0.0296*** - 0.1032 0.0032 -0.0043 0.9138*** 
Hedge 
funds 
-0.0007 0.0009 - 0.0005 0.0000 0.9415*** 
Volatile 𝜃 =
0.15 
Banks - -0.0192 0.2212 0.0405** -0.0260 1.0682*** 
Insurances 0.0418*** - 0.0977 0.0177 0.0114 0.9646*** 
Hedge 
funds 
-0.0006 -0.0000 - 0.0010 -0.0014 1.0729*** 
Volatile 𝜃 =
0.125 
Banks - -0.0394*** 0.4210** 0.0526** -0.0312 1.0810*** 
Insurances 0.0365** - 0.1101 0.0172 0.0318 0.9755*** 
Hedge 
funds 
-0.0017 0.0006 - 0.0039 -0.0016 1.0737*** 
Volatile 𝜃 =
0.1 
Banks - -0.0672** 0.3607 0.0528** 0.0125 1.0942*** 
Insurances 0.0387* - 0.1276 0.0252 0.0141 0.9911*** 
Hedge 
funds 
-0.0018 0.0013 - 0.0039 -0.0033 1.0855*** 
Notes: ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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Figure 1: Spillover Coefficients from German Banks to German Insurances 
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Figure 2: Spillover Coefficients from Hedge Funds to UK Banks 
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Appendix A. Summary table of the literature spillovers (in alphabetical order) 
Study Research question Theory Data sample Analytical method Main findings 
Adams et al. 
(2014a) 
Quantification of the 
direction, size and 
duration of risk 
spillovers among 
financial institutions 
depending on the 
state of financial 
markets 
Most risk 
measures 
underestimate 
systemic risk, but 
a state-dependent 
value at risk is 
able to reveal risk 
spillovers. 
Daily data 
(April 2, 2003 
to December 
31, 2010) for 
banks and 
insurances, 
Hedge Fund 
Research 
Equally 
Weighted 
Strategies 
Index 
Independent VaR 
estimation for all 
institutions, 
regression of the VaR 
against its own lag 
and VaR of other 
institutions and 
control variables in a 
two-stage quantile 
regression 
Spillover effects are small 
during normal periods, but 
high when the market is 
volatile. Most shocks are 
transmitted through 
commercial banks and 
predominantly hedge funds. 
Adrian & 
Brunnermeier 
(2008) 
How to measure and 
predict systemic 
risk? 
“[T]he difference 
between the 
conditional value 
at risk (CoVaR) 
of the financial 
system 
conditional on an 
institution being 
in distress and 
the CoVaR 
conditional on 
the median state 
of the institution”  
Weekly equity 
returns of all 
commercial 
banks, broker-
dealers, 
insurance and 
real estate 
companies 
publicly listed 
in the U.S. 
(1971Q1 to 
2013Q2) 
Estimation of 
Δ𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅, panel 
regression and out-
of-sample forecasts 
Δ𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅 successfully 
measures systemic risk 
Alter & Beyer 
(2014) 
What are “the 
dynamics of 
financial contagion 
among sovereigns 
and banks and […] 
the main contributors 
to contagion within 
the Eurozone” (Alter 
& Beyer, 2014, 
p.135)? 
Spillovers among 
European 
sovereigns and 
banks are caused 
by several 
transmission 
mechanisms 
(joint monetary 
policy, shared 
default risk, 
sovereign-banks 
feedback loops). 
Log-returns of 
daily CDS 
spreads from 
banks and 
sovereigns for 
eleven euro 
area countries 
(October 2009 
to July 2012) 
Vector autoregressive 
model with 
exogenous variables 
(control variables) 
and generalised 
impulse response 
functions to measure 
interaction of the 
CDS spreads and 
their included lags 
and estimate a 
contagion index 
The measured contagion 
index shows strong co-
movement for banks and 
sovereigns, which were both 
stable within a certain 
interval and increasing 
contagion for banks-to-
sovereigns and sovereigns-
to-banks indices, indicating 
that feedback loops 
intensified. 
Bernal et al. 
(2014) 
To what extent does 
distress within the 
banking, insurance 
and other financial 
services sector 
contribute to 
systemic risk? 
----- Daily data 
from 
September 21, 
2004 to March 
16, 2012 for 
the United 
States and the 
Eurozone 
∆𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅 systemic 
risk measure 
introduced by Adrian 
and Brunnermeier 
extended to include 
the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test based on 
bootstrapping 
All three analysed financial 
sectors (banking, insurance, 
and other financial services) 
contribute significantly to 
systemic risk in the 
Eurozone and the US. In 
times of distress, the other 
financial services sector 
contributes most to systemic 
risk in the Eurozone 
followed by the banking 
sector. In the US, however, 
the insurance sector was 
found to contribute most, 
while the banking sector 
contributed least to systemic 
risk. 
Bierth et al. 
(2015) 
Are life and non-life 
insurers more 
heavily exposed to 
and/or contributing 
to systemic risk due 
to their 
interconnectedness 
with the rest of the 
financial sector? 
----- Data from 253 
large 
international 
life and non-
life insurance 
firms for the 
period 2000 to 
2012 
Estimation of 
Δ𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅, marginal 
expected shortfall and 
systemic risk index as 
systemic risk 
measures, which are 
then regressed against 
factors that make an 
insurer systemically 
relevant, namely size, 
capital structure, non-
core activities and 
interconnectedness 
Systemic risk in the 
insurance sector is overall 
small compared to previous 
findings concerning banks, 
but during the financial 
crisis, systemic risk was 
significantly augmented by 
insurers. The most 
important factors were the 
insurer’s leverage and 
interconnectedness. 
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Billio et al. 
(2012) 
To what extent are 
hedge funds, banks, 
investment banks 
and insurance 
companies 
interrelated? 
The 
transformation of 
the financial and 
insurance sector 
and the increased 
business ties 
between different 
institutions 
increases shock 
transmission. 
Monthly 
equity returns 
for U.S. 
banks, broker-
dealers and 
insurances, 
monthly 
reported net-
of-fee fund 
returns for 
hedge funds 
(January 1994 
to December 
2008) 
Principal component 
analysis and linear 
and nonlinear 
Granger-causality 
tests 
Increasing 
interconnectedness of the 
four sectors, likely 
increasing systemic risk, 
shock transmission from 
banks and insurances is 
strongest 
Boyson et al. 
(2010) 
Is contagion among 
different styles of 
hedge funds present? 
Shocks to asset 
and hedge fund 
liquidity 
ultimately lead to 
hedge fund 
contagion. 
Equally 
weighted 
monthly 
hedge fund 
index data 
(January 1990 
to October 
2008) for 
different 
hedge fund 
styles 
Regression of returns 
in an AR(1) model to 
account for 
autocorrelation and 
common risk factors, 
filtered residuals in 
quantile regression 
and parametric test of 
contagion, 
multinomial 
regression analysis to 
measure intensity of 
contagion 
Observation of clustering in 
hedge fund worst returns 
unexplained by common risk 
factors, thus hedge fund 
contagion linked to liquidity 
shocks that was strongest in 
2008 
Bussière et al. 
(2015) 
What are the driving 
factors of hedge 
funds’ commonality 
and how does the 
degree of 
commonality affect 
the funds’ risk 
exposure? 
----- Hedge fund 
returns 
between 
January 1994 
and June 2009 
with a 
database of 
about 6400 
hedge funds 
PCA to measure the 
commonality in 
hedge funds, ranking 
of hedge funds into 
deciles according to 
their loading on the 
first principal 
component, stepwise 
regression of excess 
returns on 12 risk 
factors 
Commonality in hedge funds 
increased from 2003 to 
2006. 
 high 
commonality 
funds: exposed to 
equity-oriented 
risk factors, 
higher downside 
risk, higher 
illiquidity risk, 
less 
diversification 
benefits 
 low commonality 
funds: small or 
no exposure to 
equity-oriented 
risk-factors 
Chen et al. 
(2013) 
Is there Granger 
causality between 
bank and insurance 
risks? 
----- Daily data on 
CDS spreads, 
intraday data 
on stock prices 
of 11 
insurances and 
22 banks from 
February 2002 
to May 2008 
Monte Carlo 
simulation to estimate 
a systemic risk 
measure, followed by 
linear and nonlinear 
Granger causality tests 
There is a bidirectional 
causality between banks 
and insurances, but the 
effect of banks on 
insurances is longer-
lasting and stronger than 
vice versa. 
Goldsmith-
Pinkham & 
Yorulmazer 
(2010) 
Did the Northern 
Rock bank run lead to 
spillover effects in 
the banking system 
and which bank 
characteristics caused 
abnormal returns? 
----- Returns on 
stock prices of 
the ten largest 
UK banks 
(September 14, 
2007 to 
September 17, 
2007) 
Event-study using 
OLS regression 
Significant spillover 
effects due to the 
investors’ rational 
response to the illiquidity 
of the wholesale funding 
market 
Poirson & 
Schmittmann 
(2013) 
Do clusters of 
linkages between 
banks exist beyond 
market risk factors? 
----- Daily stock 
returns and 
bank indicators 
of 83 banks 
from 21 
countries 
(December 
2002 to 
November 
2011) 
Estimation of a factor 
model of return, OLS 
regression 
Sock returns of German 
banks co-move with other 
German banks, UK and 
U.S. banks; UK banks 
additionally correlate 
with other European, U.S. 
and Asian banks 
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Appendix B.1. Spillover Coefficients 
The following tables present the estimation results for the spillover coefficients for Germany and the 
UK employing REIT indices as additional control variables, but resorting to a shorter observation period 
(January 1, 2007 to July 27, 2015). Additionally, the quantile representing economic distress of an 
institution was set to 10% and 15%. Overall, the results for both, Germany and the UK, are very similar 
independently of the quantile chosen. It can also be asserted that the shorter period does not qualitatively 
alter the results. This is most probably due to the fact that the excluded period 2003 to 2006 was 
characterised by tranquillity of the financial markets and thus the modification would solely influence 
the results for tranquil quantiles (Adams et al., 2014a). These, however, stay robust as shown by 
Appendix B.1 and Appendix B.2 due to their generally low values.  
 
Appendix B.1: Spillover Coefficients for Germany including REIT Index and different 
quantiles 
 
Spillover-originating institution (spillover 
vector B) 
Control variables 
Spillover-receiving 
institution 
Banks Insurances Hedge funds 
GSCI 
index 
REIT 
index 
Non-financial 
index 
Lagged 
𝑉𝑎𝑅 
Tranquil 𝜃 =
0.75 
Banks - 0.0007 0.0185 0.0051 0.0010 -0.0081 0.9492*** 
Insurances 0.0060 - 0.0431* 0.0017 -0.0012 0.008 0.9241*** 
Hedge 
funds 
-0.0004 -0.0011 - 0.0008 -0.0002 0.0010 0.9036*** 
Normal 𝜃 =
0.5 
Banks - 0.0090 0.0808* -0.0031 0.0102 -0.0041 0.9633*** 
Insurances 0.0052 - 0.0560 0.0045 0.0024 0.0004 0.9481*** 
Hedge 
funds 
-0.0017 0.0009 - -0.0003 0.0011 0.0007 0.9457*** 
Volatile 𝜃 =
0.15 
Banks - 0.0659** 0.1536 -0.0009 0.0345*** -0.0261 0.9853*** 
Insurances 0.0052 - 0.0829 0.0060 0.0025 0.0080 1.0233*** 
Hedge 
funds 
-0.0001 0.0027 - -0.0001 0.0033* -0.0082** 1.0689*** 
Volatile 𝜃 =
0.125 
Banks - 0.0621* 0.2209 0.0083 0.0226 -0.0296 1.0039*** 
Insurances 0.0057 - 0.1417 0.0076 -0.0007 0.0062 1.0342*** 
Hedge 
funds 
-0.0011 0.0042 - -0.0010 0.0035 -0.0082** 1.0758*** 
Volatile 𝜃 =
0.1 
Banks - 0.0739* 0.2896* -0.0013 0.0306 -0.0102 1.0176*** 
Insurances 0.0193 - 0.2853*** 0.0126 -0.0105 0.0067 1.0256*** 
Hedge 
funds 
-0.0019 0.0022 - 0.0021 0.0025 -0.0085** 1.0964*** 
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Appendix B.2: Spillover Coefficients for the UK including REIT index and different 
quantiles 
 
Spillover-originating institution (spillover 
vector B) 
Control variables 
Spillover-receiving 
institution 
Banks Insurances Hedge funds 
GSCI 
index 
REIT 
index 
Non-financial 
index 
Lagged 
𝑉𝑎𝑅 
Tranquil 𝜃 =
0.75 
Banks - -0.0037 0.0450 -0.0020 0.0063 0.0149 0.9322*** 
Insurances 0.0153*** - 0.0599 -0.0021 -0.0113 0.0051 0.9097*** 
Hedge 
funds 
0.0001 -0.0007 - 0.0006 -0.0000 0.0005 0.9010*** 
Normal 𝜃 =
0.5 
Banks - -0.0053 0.0679 0.0073 0.0077 0.0088 0.9624*** 
Insurances 0.0312*** - 0.0852 0.0050 -0.0079 -0.0057 0.9210*** 
Hedge 
funds 
-0.0006 0.0010 - 0.0006 -0.0003 -0.0001 0.9424*** 
Volatile 𝜃 =
0.15 
Banks - -0.0198 0.2178 0.0399 0.0056 -0.0283 1.0651*** 
Insurances 0.0458** - 0.1120 0.0221 -0.0068 0.0071 0.9636*** 
Hedge 
funds 
-0.0015 -0.0011 - -0.0016 0.0039* 0.0003 1.0622*** 
Volatile 𝜃 =
0.125 
Banks - -0.0413** 0.4131* 0.0429* 0.0133 -0.0292 1.0774*** 
Insurances 0.0491** - 0.1428 0.0408** -0.0331* 0.0137 0.9848*** 
Hedge 
funds 
-0.0023 0.0003 - 0.0003 0.0037 -0.0019 1.0804*** 
Volatile 𝜃 =
0.1 
Banks - -0.0645** 0.3628 0.0581** 0.0031 0.0079 1.0899*** 
Insurances 0.0470** - 0.1996 0.0406* -0.0218 -0.0044 0.9955*** 
Hedge 
funds 
-0.0036** -0.0000 - 0.0010 0.0055* -0.0018 1.0843*** 
 
